Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms
Author
Summary, in English
Abstract in Undetermined
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.
Department/s
- Theoretical Philosophy
- CogComlab
Publishing year
2014
Language
English
Pages
445-464
Publication/Series
Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology
Volume
5
Issue
4
Full text
- Available as PDF - 149 kB
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Links
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch
Topic
- Philosophy
Status
Published
Research group
- CogComlab
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 2069-0533