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From virtue to decency

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Author

Summary, in English

In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality.

Publishing year

2006

Language

English

Pages

589-604

Publication/Series

Metaphilosophy

Volume

37

Issue

5

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Slote
  • supererogation
  • rightness
  • Hursthouse
  • virtue
  • commonsense
  • morality

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1467-9973