The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

In Elder-Vass’s response to my (2014) it is maintained: (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts; (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts; and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification (Elder-Vass forthcoming). In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers.

Department/s

Publishing year

2014

Language

English

Pages

798-809

Publication/Series

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volume

44

Issue

6

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • causal power
  • critical realism
  • emergence
  • mereology
  • ontological individualism
  • social structure

Status

Published

Project

  • Social Ontology and Theories of Persistence
  • Metaphysics and Collectivity

Research group

  • Metaphysics and Collectivity

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0048-3931