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Speech is Silver; Silence is Golden

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Author

Summary, in English

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly,the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when

communication is costly compared to when it is free.

Publishing year

2013

Language

English

Pages

497-507

Publication/Series

Games

Volume

4

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article (letter)

Publisher

MDPI AG

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • free-riding
  • communication
  • coordination

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 2073-4336