The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

The defeasible nature of coherentist justification

På svenska

Author

  • Staffan Angere

Summary, in English

The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification.

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Pages

321-335

Publication/Series

Synthese

Volume

157

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • defeasible justification
  • measure theory
  • Coherence

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0039-7857