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Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness

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Author

Summary, in English

This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.

Publishing year

2008

Language

English

Pages

321-338

Publication/Series

Review of Economic Design

Volume

11

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Indivisibles
  • fairness
  • weak fairness
  • strategy-pr

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1434-4742