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Physical Persons. An Essay on Reconciliatory Physicalism

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Author

Summary, in English

<i>Physical Persons</i> explores the nature of mind and self, and their relation to the body. It argues that folk-psychological expressions about persons are indeed irreducible and true, however, this can be reconciled with the view that persons are physical beings. Not only is it argued that what we call 'mental properties' are in fact physical properties, but also that what we refer to as 'the self' is the physical brain.



The solution to both these problems is based on the idea that what we refer to as 'mental properties' and 'the self' are systematically elusive, or transcendent. What we know of 'mental properties' is only their content, the 'virtual' objects they have. But since such objects do not exist, they constitute no threat to physicalism. The self, on the other hand, is a theoretical entity which gives a person his identity and unifies his mind. Since the self is theoretical, it can be identified with the brain.

Publishing year

1999

Language

English

Document type

Dissertation

Publisher

Förlags AB Gondolin

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • self-brain
  • unity of mind
  • personal identity
  • self
  • mental properties
  • physicalism
  • mind-body
  • Philosophical logic
  • Teoretisk filosofi
  • logik

Status

Published

Supervisor

  • [unknown] [unknown]

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 91-88820-85-8
  • ISRN: LUHFDA/HFFT--99/1010--SE+265

Defence date

18 December 1999

Defence time

10:15

Defence place

Sal 104 Kungshuset

Opponent

  • Fredrik Stjernberg (Dr.)