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Collectivity and Circularity

På svenska

Author

Editor

  • Kathinka Schulte-Osterman
  • Nikos Psarros
  • Hans Bernhard Schmid

Summary, in English

The common claim that the notion of collective action must figure in the content of the attitudes of the parties to a collective action gives rise to a circularity challenge. Standard responses to this challenge are criticized. This article’s solution exploits a notion of collectivity that does not presuppose intention: a purely causal conception that can be explicated in terms of dispositions and causal agency. Participants in a jointly intentional collective action do not need to possess a stronger notion of collectivity than this. In particular, they do not need to possess the concept of a jointly intentional collective action.

Publishing year

2008

Language

English

Publication/Series

Concepts of Sharedness - Essays on Collective Intentionality

Document type

Book chapter

Publisher

Ontos Verlag

Topic

  • Philosophy

Status

Published

Project

  • Gruppmoral och individuellt anvar

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 978-3-938793-96-1