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Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money

På svenska

Author

Summary, in English

Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with strategy-proofness and nonbossiness. Under various additional assumptions - neutrality, individual rationality, object efficiency, weak decentralization - the distribution of the divisible good is further restricted. For instance, under neutrality the outcome of the mechanism can have only one distribution, which is hence independent of individual preferences. In this case the mechanism becomes serially dictatorial. On the other hand, individual rationality leads to a fixed price equilibrium with a well-defined rationing method (Gale's top-trading cycle procedure).

Publishing year

2002

Language

English

Pages

483-502

Publication/Series

Economic Theory

Volume

20

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • indivisible object
  • strategy-proof
  • nonbossy
  • housing market

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1432-0479