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A problem for confirmation theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy

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Author

Summary, in English

This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the confirmation theorist to come to terms with the problem, and argues that none of them are successful.

Publishing year

2016

Language

English

Pages

437-449

Publication/Series

Philosophical Studies

Volume

173

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Conjunction fallacy
  • Inverse conjunction fallacy
  • Bayesian epistemology
  • Bayesian confirmation theory
  • Formal measures of confirmation

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0031-8116