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Of boundaries and metaphysical starting points: why the extended mind cannot be so lightly dismissed

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Author

  • Joel Parthemore

Summary, in English

The extended mind debate is, to large extent, a debate over where and how to locate the boundary between cognitive mind and non-cognitive world. Concepts of “internal” and “external”, taken from the domain of physical volumes, are metaphorical, at best, applied to entities like mind. Strongly held intuitions betray metaphysical starting points that prejudice the debate. If one does not accept these starting points, then the “just obvious” claims made by critics of extended mind are far less clear. The mind/world distinction is, ultimately, a conceptual one, and like most if not all conceptual distinctions, subject to shift over time.

Publishing year

2011

Language

English

Pages

79-94

Publication/Series

Teorema

Volume

30

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

KRK Ediciones

Topic

  • Languages and Literature

Keywords

  • boundary
  • intuitions
  • realism
  • anti-realism
  • enactivism

Status

Published

Project

  • Centre for Cognitive Semiotics (RJ)

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0210-1602