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Is There an Optimal Strategic Oil Reserve for Each Country? A Study Based on the Game Theory

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Author

  • Junan Yang
  • Ronggang Cong

Summary, in English

In generally, there is a phenomenon of “free rider” in the establishment of national oil reserves for different countries, which means that they have the tendency of underestimating the strategic oil reserves. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon from the perspective of non-cooperative game theory. It also analyzes the establishment of strategic oil reserve among different countries based on the coalition game theory and presents the core solution for it. The results show that based on a certain constraint mechanism, it is feasible for different countries to establish their own suitable strategic oil reserves in theory and practice.

Publishing year

2014

Language

English

Pages

69-72

Publication/Series

The Open Fuels & Energy Science Journal

Volume

7

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Bentham Open

Topic

  • Earth and Related Environmental Sciences

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1876-973X