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Ceteris Paribus in Conservative Epistemic Change

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Author

Summary, in English

This work contrasts conservative or minimally mutilating revisions of empirical theories as they are identified in the presently dominant AGM model of formal belief revision and the structuralist program for the reconstruction of empirical theories. The aim is to make understandable why both approaches only partly succeed in substantially informing and formally restraining the issue. With respect to the rationality of minimal change, the overall result is negative. Readers with an interest in formal epistemology are provided with application cases (mercury anomaly, revision of early thermo-dynamics, introduction of the neutrino), the historically inclined reader is offered a systematic perspective. The discussion can largely be followed without a background in formal logic.

Publishing year

2009

Language

English

Document type

Dissertation

Publisher

Peter Lang Publishing Group

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • minimal change
  • mercury anomaly
  • ceteris paribus laws
  • completeness assumptions
  • epistemic entrenchment

Status

Published

Supervisor

  • Ulrich Gähde

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 978-3-631-57283-2

Defence date

7 September 2007

Defence time

14:00

Defence place

Hamburg

Opponent

  • Erik Olsson (Prof)