Dual-reason analyses revisited
Author
Summary, in English
Abstract in Undetermined
Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place—where “favouring on account of” refers to the agent’s so-called motivating reason. This paper discusses this novel approach to fitting-attitude (and buck-passing) analysis: should those considerations (facts or features) that constitute the reason for favouring also be included in the intentional content of the favouring. In other words, should fitting-attitude analysts require a reference to the agent’s motivating reason in the analysis? While this enlargement of the original proposal might seem intuitive given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis
Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place—where “favouring on account of” refers to the agent’s so-called motivating reason. This paper discusses this novel approach to fitting-attitude (and buck-passing) analysis: should those considerations (facts or features) that constitute the reason for favouring also be included in the intentional content of the favouring. In other words, should fitting-attitude analysts require a reference to the agent’s motivating reason in the analysis? While this enlargement of the original proposal might seem intuitive given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis
Department/s
Publishing year
2012
Language
English
Document type
Conference paper
Topic
- Philosophy
Keywords
- value analysis
- fitting-attitude analysis
- motivating reasons
- normative reasons
- intentionality
- intentional content
Conference name
Mini-symposium ‘Ethical Theory and Practical Ethics’
Conference date
2012-04-27
Status
Unpublished
Project
- On Our Good Reasons