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Coherence as a heuristic

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Author

  • Staffan Angere

Summary, in English

The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from each other when more knowledge is added.

Publishing year

2008

Language

English

Pages

1-26

Publication/Series

Mind

Volume

117

Issue

465

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Coherence
  • probabilistic measures

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0026-4423