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Is there a way for constructivism to distinguish what we experience from what we represent?

På svenska

Author

Editor

  • Alexander Riegler
  • Markus Peschl

Summary, in English

When constructivism gives up reality as a way of accounting for representations it looses a powerful tool of explanation. Why do we have the representations we have? How are they interrelated? This article attempts to investigate what possible means a constructivistic theory has to maintain the distinction between representations and experience, between memory and imagination, and between correct and mistaken perceptions. Phenomenological qualities and coherence are the solutions advocated, but how they are combined will have an impact on what sort of constructivistic theories that can be maintained.

Publishing year

1997

Language

English

Publication/Series

Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences - Does Representation Need Reality?

Document type

Conference paper

Publisher

ASoCS Report 97-01

Topic

  • Psychology (excluding Applied Psychology)
  • Philosophy

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISBN: 0306462869