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The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure

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Author

Summary, in English

Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used.

Publishing year

2002

Language

English

Pages

155-183

Publication/Series

Journal of Economics

Volume

77

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • screening
  • information service
  • market behavior

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1617-7134