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Bivalence and future contingency

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Author

  • Carlo Proietti
  • Gabriel Sandu
  • Francois Rivenc

Editor

  • Vincent Hendricks
  • Sven Ove Hansson

Summary, in English

This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics. All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that propositions

concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value (true or false). We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and T x W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness and their underlying metaphysics of time.

Department/s

Publishing year

2014

Language

English

Publication/Series

Handbook of Formal Philosophy

Document type

Book chapter

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Status

Inpress

Research group

  • Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)