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Strategic self-ignorance

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Author

  • Linda Thunström
  • Jonas Nordström
  • Jason F. Shogren
  • Mariah Ehmke
  • Klaas van't Veld

Summary, in English

We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals—a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58%) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.

Publishing year

2016-04-15

Language

English

Pages

117-136

Publication/Series

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

Volume

52

Issue

2

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Strategic ignorance
  • Calorie information avoidance
  • Guilt aversion
  • Selfcontrol
  • Strategic ignorance
  • Calorie information avoidance
  • Guilt aversion
  • Self-control
  • D03
  • D81
  • D83

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1573-0476