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Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition

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Author

Summary, in English

Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.

Publishing year

2009

Language

English

Pages

449-462

Publication/Series

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Volume

12

Issue

5

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Springer

Topic

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Transparency
  • Practicality
  • Moral psychology
  • Ethics
  • Methodology

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1386-2820